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Family Reunification in Germany, Netherlands and the EU 
since 2000: Reciprocal Influence and the Role of National and 
EU Actors 
 
Kees Groenendijk & Tineke Strik* 
 
 
I. Introduction: Klaus Barwig and Europe 
Klaus Barwig, as father and custodian of the “Hohenheimer Tage zum Ausländer-
recht”, always had an open eye for developments outside Germany. He invited par-
ticipants and speakers from neighbouring countries, even if they were not German 
speakers. We both learned a lot about the German policies and case-law, but also 
learned to speak (not write) German in public in Hohenheim. Klaus stimulated 
young students and researchers from other European countries to participate in the 
Network Migrationsrecht, the next generation of immigration law experts he nur-
tured from its inception. Klaus also had an early eye for the growing relevance of EU 
migration law for the legal practice in Germany and other EU states. Our contribu-
tion reflects the European perspective in the activities of Klaus: how does the law 
and practice regarding family reunification in Germany and the Netherlands influ-
ence developments in the other state since the start of the negotiations on the EU 
Family Reunification Directive in 2000? 
I.1  European Harmonization and Mutual Influence 
Since the beginning of this century, the European Union has been working towards 
common rules on legal migration and a European Common Asylum System. Now, 
seventeen years later, the process of harmonization has been strengthened in two 
ways: first, many asylum directives have been revised with a view to further harmo-
nization and second, the Court of Justice has developed case-law which sets clear 
limits and obligations for Member States while applying the directives and regula-
tions. The directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification, like most other di-
rectives on legal migration, has not been subject to a review process. However, the 
directive, the case law of the CJEU on its interpretation as well as the guidelines for 
its application released by the Commission in 2014, may have contributed to a fur-
ther convergence of national family reunification rules in the Member States.1 
                                                     
*  Centre for Migration Law, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 
 This paper was first published in: S. Beichel-Bendetti & C. Janda (ed.), Hohenheimer Horizonte. 
Festschrift für Klaus Barwig, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2018, p. 355-381. 
1  CJEU, C-540/03 (Parliament against Council); CJEU, C-578/08 (Chakroun); C-153/14 (K. and A.); 
C-558/14 (Khachab); Guidelines on the Application of the Family Reunification Directive, COM 
(2014) 210, 3 April 2014; K. Groenendijk et al., The Family Reunification Directive in EU Member 
States: the first year of implementation, Nijmegen: Radboud University, Centre for Migration 
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These types of norm-setting have influenced the national policies merely by 
limiting the national discretion. Member States within the margins allowed by the 
Family Reunification Directive on purpose or unconsciously influence national politi-
cal choices of other Member States. This mutual influence can take place through 
different channels and at different stages of the harmonization process. In our con-
tribution, this process of mutual influence is explored and analysed with regard to 
Germany and the Netherlands. One of the sources of this article is the dissertation 
of Tineke Strik, concerning the decision making process and the implementation of 
the Family Reunification Directive and the Asylum Procedure Directive, with a focus 
on the policies and positions of Germany and the Netherlands.2 For her study, Strik 
interviewed policy makers, negotiators and other actors in Germany, the Nether-
lands and Brussels. In this article, we first investigate the possible channels for this 
mutual influence. Secondly, we look for the issues were this mutual influence be-
tween the two neighbouring states actually occurred. Thirdly, we try to describe the 
relevant processes in more detail in a case study on the German language test and 
the Dutch integration test abroad. In the final part, we draw some more general 
conclusions. 
II.  Channels of Influence 
II.1  During the Negotiations on the Directive 
The first stage of mutual influence concerns the negotiation process, during which 
Member States tried to insert their national rules and policy plans in the Family Re-
unification Directive. Germany and the Netherlands, like other Member States, ini-
tially only aimed for the preservation of their national legislation. The formal aim of 
harmonisation was considered as a desirable effect, but not as an independent am-
bition. In the course of the negotiations, both states increasingly also aimed at pre-
serving national sovereignty with a view to shaping their family reunification policy 
at their discretion. We identify three reasons for this change of emphasis. First, the 
proposals of other delegations inspired them to instigate policy changes in their 
own Member State. Second, the awareness of the binding character of the direc-
tives grew among the delegations, which motivated them to make several clauses in 
the directive more permissive. Finally, the long duration of the negotiations led to 
new political plans and aspirations arising at home, as a result of changes of gov-
ernment or new national debates and plans. In the Netherlands, the right-wing coa-
lition Balkenende I (CDA, VVD, LPF) announced restrictive measures on family reuni-
                                                     
Law 2007; Odysseus Academic Network, Conformity checking of the transposition by Member 
States of 10 EC directives in the sector of Asylum and Immigration, Brussels: European Commis-
sion 2007; Y. Pascouau & H. Labayle, Conditions for family reunification under strain, Brussels: 
European Policy Centre 2011. See also the recent EMN comparative report, Family Reunifica-
tion for Third Country Nationals in the EU Member States and Norway: national practices, Brus-
sels: European Commission 2017. 
2  T. Strik, Besluitvorming over asiel- en migratierichtlijnen. De wisselwerking tussen nationaal en 
Europees niveau, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2011. 
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fication in its coalition agreement of 2002, which forced the Dutch delegation in 
Brussels to change its position and to bring in new proposals at a relatively late 
stage of the negotiations. In Germany, the report of the Zuwanderungskommission 
presented in July 2001 as well as the legislative proposal for the Zuwander-
ungsgesetz submitted by the government to the Bundestag in November 2001, 
made the German delegation even more reluctant to agree on any issue out of fear 
of reducing the room the discretion of the national legislator.3 
As legal safeguards for asylum seekers or migrants create obligations for Mem-
ber States and thus limit their sovereignty, Germany and Netherlands like most oth-
er Member States aimed at lowering the proposed level of protection and maintain-
ing discretion to adapt their legislation to a minimum level. 
To this end, they submitted many amendments to the Commission’s proposal, 
frequently proposing to delete provisions, weaken the text from shall- to may-
clauses or to add derogation clauses.4 Most delegations applied the non-
intervention principle, taking a neutral position regarding proposals from other del-
egations lowering the standards or widening national discretion. The negotiation 
table thus transformed into a ‘market of optional provisions’, where delegations 
mutually supported each other’s proposals. 
Both Germany and the Netherlands were successful in getting their proposed 
amendments accepted, although they used different strategies.5 The German dele-
gation benefitted from its negotiation weight at all negotiation levels, from the 
working group, to the ministerial level, using a lot of speaking time and displaying in 
the eyes of other delegations a rather surly and intimidating attitude. For more than 
a year, the delegation blocked the negotiations and was unreceptive to proposals 
from the Commission or the Presidency. Although this often led to an isolated posi-
tion, the political weight of Germany finally resulted in acceptance of its objections 
and proposals. The German delegation could afford to persevere in its resistance 
until their text proposal was accepted in full. This was important to Germany, be-
cause it needed the certainty that the national rules of the Zuwanderungsgesetz 
under preparation would fit within the directives in order to convince governments 
of the Länder, which were co-responsible for the implementation of that legislation. 
The Dutch delegation realised it had to compensate its relatively light political 
weight in order to be successful. As it was more dependent on the support of other 
Member States, the Dutch delegation frequently organised bilateral consultations 
and invested in its personal relations with other negotiators. The Dutch negotiators 
                                                     
3  R. Süsmuth et al., Zuwanderung gestalten, Integration fördern, Bericht der Unabhängigen 
Kommission ‘Zuwanderung’, Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern 2001; Entwurf eines Geset-
zes zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der 
Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (Zuwanderungsgesetz), BT-Drs. 14/7387 und 
BTDrs. 14/7987. 
4  C. Hauschild, ‘Neues europäisches Einwanderungsrecht: Das Recht auf Familienzusammenfüh-
rung’, ZAR 2003: 266-273. For an analysis of all factors determining the negotiations result, see 
T. Strik, Besluitvorming over asiel- en migratierichtlijnen. De wisselwerking tussen nationaal en 
Europees niveau, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2011, Chapter 9. 
5  See also A. Walter, Familienzusammenführung in Europa, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2009. 
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also bolstered their opportunities to influence the directives by acting as an expert 
or a mediator, or by making the German delegation present or defend a proposal. 
The Dutch had to content themselves with compromises more often than the Ger-
man delegation, but found a solution by interpreting the formulation in a way that 
did not require adaptation of its national legislation.6 It accordingly accepted the 
risk that this interpretation would be overruled by a Dutch court or the CJEU at a 
later stage. 
The strategy of mutual support by the national delegations for restrictive 
amendments resulted in a more permissive character of the directives. A number of 
precise requirements were replaced by optional provisions, including references to 
the national system or international obligations or by the obligation to make na-
tional rules on certain issues.7 The Family Reunification Directive furthermore in-
cludes a number of derogation clauses and many vague and open formulations, 
leaving Member States room for interpretation. A number of issues were deleted 
from the directives and some provisions were transposed to the preamble. As a 
result of these active interventions by Member States, the Family Reunification Di-
rective now mirrors many elements of national legislation, which Member States 
are allowed or even obliged to apply. In this way, the Europeanisation process led to 
a mutual influence of the national legislation on family reunification, even though 
the origin of the clauses may not always be clear. However, the directive essentially 
reflects the national legislation of northern Member States: the southern Member 
States were relatively passive in their involvement as their legislation on migration 
was not yet that developed or detailed, and the eastern Member States did not take 
part in the negotiations, which took place before their accession date. 
Apart from this more indirect influence, the process of Europeanisation offered 
Germany and the Netherlands many avenues to become mutually inspired by their 
national policies. During the negotiation process, the national delegations met and 
exchanged views and information. While trying to get support for their amend-
ments, they explained why they had or wanted this policy and how it worked or 
would work. Especially during the last stage of the negotiations on the Family Reuni-
fication Directive, Germany and the Netherlands showed mutual interest in their 
policies, as they both looked for ways to make the national family reunification 
rules more restrictive. 
II.2. After Adoption of the Directive 
After adoption, Member States used the transposition by another state as a source 
of inspiration. As the Netherlands partially transposed the Family Reunification Di-
                                                     
6  K. Groenendijk & P. Minderhoud, ‘De Nederlandse invloed op nieuwe Europese regels betref-
fende migratie en asiel’, in: W. Asbeek Brusse, D. Broeders & R. Griffiths, Immigratie en asiel in 
Europa. Een lange weg naar gemeenschappelijkheid?, Utrecht: Lemma 2004, p. 137-161. 
7  Ph. De Bruycker, ‘Le niveau d’harmonisation légisative de la politique européenne d’immi-
gration et d’asyle’, in: F. Julien-Laferrière, H. Labayle & Ö. Edström (eds), The European Immi-
gration and Asylum Policy: Critical Assessment Five Years After the Amsterdam Treaty, Brussels: 
Réseau Odysseus Network 2005, p. 54-76. 
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rective already one year after adoption,8 the German government made a thorough 
assessment of the way the Netherlands had implemented the optional clauses of 
the directive. The Dutch government actively advocated for the export of their poli-
cies, in order to gain support from other Member States during conformity discus-
sions with the Commission. The German Ministry of Interior was in favour of adopt-
ing parts of the Dutch implementation and used the Dutch legislation as an argu-
ment to overcome hesitations of the Ministry of Justice about the constitutionality 
of the proposed implementation. As the Netherlands is a constitutional state, the 
implementing act should thus be in line with the rule of law, was the line of reason-
ing of the Ministry of Interior in Berlin.9 
Also after the transposition stage, national civil servants exchanged information 
on their policies during the so-called contact-committees, convened by the Europe-
an Commission in Brussels. The Commission organized these meetings to promote a 
harmonized and correct application of the directive. However, officials at those 
meetings also gained new ideas on how to restrict their family reunification policies. 
The Dutch government in 2010-2012 actively looked for national examples to re-
strict family reunification within the limits of the directive, after the Commission 
had refused to present a proposal to review the directive. This refusal had blocked 
the Dutch aspiration to introduce an education requirement and an age-limit of 24 
years for spouses, both clearly incompatible with Directive 2003/86. During its as-
sessment of other restricting measures such as an accommodation requirement, 
the Dutch government closely looked at German practices as well.10 These types of 
mutual inspiration also occurred at the ministerial level, during Council Meetings or 
bilateral meetings, but also during discussions and exchanges within the European 
political parties. 
II.3  Case Law as Channel of Mutual Influence 
Another channel, through which national policies of Member State can mutually 
influence each other, is the case law on the Family Reunification Directive, which 
has led to a clear standard setting by the Court of Justice on the interpretation of 
the directive and the way Member States have to apply its provisions. Through 
these judgements, which merely follow from a specific question of interpretation or 
a conformity issue in one Member State, policies and legislation of other Member 
States are affected as well. This is for instance the case with the Chakroun judge-
ment, where the Court of Justice made clear that on the basis of the definition of 
the term family reunification in the directive, Member States are not allowed to 
make a distinction between (the rules for) family formation and family reunifica-
                                                     
8  Staatsblad 2004, nr. 496, 12 October 2004. 
9  T. Strik, Besluitvorming over asiel- en migratierichtlijnen. De wisselwerking tussen nationaal en 
Europees niveau, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2011, p. 163. 
10  Kamerstukken II 2009-2010, 32 175, nr. 1; Kamerstukken II 2011-2012, 32 175, nr. 32, with at-
tachment. 
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tion.11 With the implementation of the directive, the German legislator had dimin-
ished this distinction by reducing the waiting period for family formation from five 
to two years, in line with Article 8 of the directive, with the condition that the resi-
dence permit is renewable in view of the purpose of residence.12 With this imple-
mentation, the German legislator still maintained a different treatment of for-
mation and reunification in two ways, as for reunification only one year of residence 
is required and no additional condition on the prospect of residence applies. 
Through the Chakroun case, the difference in treatment between family reunifica-
tion and family formation in the Netherlands was subject to a judicial debate that 
ended up in Luxemburg. We now know from the answer of the Court of Justice that 
the relevant German rules do not comply with the directive, even though this dif-
ference in treatment was not questioned during or after the German implementa-
tion. 
The other element of the Chakroun judgement, the level of the income re-
quirement, has had an impact on the German legislation as well. Two years before 
the CJEU judgment in Chakroun, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht had decided that 
only in exceptional, a-typical circumstances, there could be very weighty reasons to 
derogate from the income requirement.13 Eight months later the same court con-
firmed its judgement, considering that the law does not grant any discretion to the 
immigration authorities to derogate from the legal income requirement. It was only 
up to the national court to assess if a derogation from the rule was justified, in the 
light of Article 6 GG or Article 8 EMRK.14 The Bundesverwaltungsgericht referred to 
the income requirement of Article 7 (1) of the directive, but not to the obligation of 
an individual assessment of Article 17. That the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, three 
years after the first CJEU judgement on the directive, had reduced instead of en-
larged the room for an individual assessment, was heavily criticised in Germany.15 
The arguments for this criticism were reflected in the Chakroun judgement one year 
later.16 So even without a reference from a German court or an infringement pro-
cedure against Germany, the German legislation had to create more discretion for 
the individual assessment of whether sufficient income was available, because the 
Dutch legislation provoked a referral by a Dutch court and a decision of the CJEU. 
The referral by the Dutch court was triggered by the critical remarks on the Dutch 
                                                     
11  CJEU, C-578/08 (Chakroun), paragraph 59 and 62. See Article 2 sub d Directive 2003/86 for the 
definition. 
12  See § 30 paragraph 3, sub d AuftenthG. 
13  BVerwG, 1 C 32.07, paragraph 27. 
14  BVerwG, 1 C 3.08, paragraphs 10-14. 
15  K. Dienelt, BVerwG: Versagung des Ehegattennachzugs bei fehlender Sicherung des Lebensun-
terhalts mit Anmerkung, at: www.migrationsrecht.net; K. Dienelt, Das Bundesverwaltungsge-
richt versagt Familiennachzug wegen fehlender Lebensunterhaltssicherung, at: www.migra-
tionsrecht.net. 
16  K. Dienelt, EuGH legt Anforderungen an die Lebensunterhalssicherung beim Familiennachzug 
fest- Unvereinbarkeit mit den deutschen Vorgaben im AufenthG, at: www.migrationsrecht.net. 
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income requirement in the 2008 Commission’s report on the application of the di-
rective in Member States.17 
II.4  The Directive is Binding Law After All 
These examples illustrate that the Family Reunification Directive also had its impact 
on the national policies of the northern Member States, despite their (perceived) 
successful negotiations. Transposition studies show that the directive has both 
strengthened and weakened the right to family reunification, but that the number 
of liberalisations outweigh the restrictions.18 Especially in Member States where the 
national rules on family reunification were vague, offering broad discretion to the 
national authorities, the directive led to the codification of the right to family reuni-
fication in national law. This strengthening effect becomes clear in comparison with 
Member States who are not bound by the directive: an interdisciplinary study on 
family reunification policies across six EU Member States shows that the require-
ments in Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom are clearly exceeding the limits 
set by the Directive.19 Denmark requires an age-limit of 24 years for both spouses, 
an integration assessment for children who travel to their parent(s) residing in 
Denmark (if they travel later than two years after the parent became entitled to 
family reunification) and family reunification may be refused if the common ties of 
the spouses with another country prevail over their ties with Denmark.20 The in-
come requirements in Ireland and the UK are significantly higher than those in the 
Member States bound by the directive.21 In the UK, very high fees for family reunifi-
cation have to be paid.22 Some governments bound by the directive envisaged the 
same policy measures, but were constrained by the directive. For those countries, 
the directive meant that the race to the bottom was stopped by its minimum stand-
ards.23 Within the limits of the Family Reunification Directive however, Member 
                                                     
17  COM(2008) 610 of 8 October 2008, p. 7, published 3 months before the reference in Chakroun. 
18  K. Groenendijk et al., The Family Reunification Directive in EU Member States: the first year of 
implementation, Nijmegen: Radboud University, Centre for Migration Law 2007; Odysseus Aca-
demic Network, Conformity checking of the transposition by Member States of 10 EC directives 
in the sector of Asylum and Immigration, Brussels European Commission 2007; Y. Pascouau & H. 
Labayle, Conditions for family reunification under strain, Brussels: European Commission 2011. 
19  T. Strik, B. de Hart & E. Nissen, Family Reunification: a barrier or facilitator of integration? A 
comparative study, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2013. 
20  See for the European case-law on the Danish policies ECtHR of 24 May 2016, Biao v Denmark, 
application no. 38590/10 on the compliance with Article 8 and 14 ECHR; CJEU 12 April 2016, 
Caner Genc v Integrationsministeriet, C-561/14 on the compliance with the standstill clause of 
Decision no. 1/80, EEC-Turkey Association Agreement. 
21  See H. Becker, C. Cosgrave & M. Labor, Family Reunification: a barrier or facilitator of integra-
tion? Country Report Ireland, Dublin: Immigrant Council of Ireland 2013, and E. Sibley, E. Fe-
nelon & N. Mole, Family Reunification requirements: a barrier or facilitator of integration? Unit-
ed Kingdom Summary Report, London: Aire Centre 2013. 
22  M. Gower & T. McGuinness, The financial (minimum income) requirement for partner visas, 
Research briefing papers SN06724, London: House of Commons Library 2017. 
23  T. Strik, Besluitvorming over asiel- en migratierichtlijnen. De wisselwerking tussen nationaal en 
Europees niveau, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2011, para 10.2.1. 
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States have used their discretion to introduce restrictive measures. Their move to-
wards the bottom, de facto leads to a harmonisation at the level of the minimum 
standards set by the directive.24 
The developing case law on the Family Reunification Directive however, con-
tributes to a further limitation of the national discretion and the rise of the mini-
mum standards, as the Court of Justice imposes a strict interpretation of the op-
tional clauses.25 This trend has been fuelled since lawyers and judges became ac-
quainted with European Migration Law and its implications, and national courts 
started submitting requests for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice. One 
important implication of this case law is that the directive not only affects national 
policymaking, but also the decision-making by immigration authorities in individual 
cases. The Union law requirement of conformity with the proportionality principle 
requires assessing all individual interests and circumstances in the light of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the other principles of Union Law. This implied 
the abolishment of a standardised decisionmaking system with a more or less au-
tomatic rejection in case not all requirements are fully met. Furthermore, since the 
CJEU case law on the directive, a marginal judicial scrutiny is no longer sufficient: 
national judges are required to do a full judicial review and scrutinize the merits and 
the facts of a case.26 These effects confirm the assumption of migration scholars 
that “policy makers (…) have lost power to the courts”.27 
Therefore, despite the national reflexes described previously, the norms of the 
Family Reunification Directive have undoubtedly strengthened the legal safeguards 
for third country nationals who want to reunite with their family members. The 
Family Reunification Directive has, unlike art. 8 ECHR, established a subjective right 
to family reunification. This limits the margin of appreciation of the Member States 
while applying the permitted conditions for admission, withdrawal or (non-) renew-
al. Furthermore, the legal position of admitted family members had not been laid 
down in such a concrete manner in other European or international instruments 
before. Moreover, with the adoption of the directive, family reunification legislation 
has become part of the Union law. As courts interpret the norms within the frame-
work of European Union law, the textual compromises between national delega-
tions may have a more far-reaching or binding meaning than the negotiators had in 
mind. 
                                                     
24  See f.i. L. Block & S.A. Bonjour, ‘Fortress Europe or Europe of Rights? The Europeanisation of 
family migration policies in France, Germany and the Netherlands’, 2013 European Journal of 
Migration and Law 15 (2): 203-224. 
25  CJEU, C-578/08 (Chakroun), paragraph 43. 
26  COM(2014)210, paragraph 7.5. 
27  S. Bonjour, ‘The Power and Morals of Policymakers. Reassessing the Control Gap Debate’, 
2011The International Migration Review 45(1): 89-122; S. Bonjour, ‘Speaking of Rights: The In-
fluence of Law and Courts on the Making of Family Migration Policies in Germany’, 2016 Law & 
Policy 38 (4): 328-348; L. Kawar, Contesting immigration Policy in Court. Legal activism and its 
radiating effects in the United States and France, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015. 
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III.  Which issues? 
There are several similarities in the transposition of the directive by the Dutch and 
German governments. In both countries the legislator strengthened the rights to 
family reunification as a result of the directive and was restrained from introducing 
certain restrictions, proposed by right-wing parties (in the Netherlands) or some 
Länder (in Germany). We will highlight three issues where the mutual influence of 
the governments became clear: the age-limit, the language requirement and the 
time limit for applications by refugees. 
III.1  Age-limit 
As previously mentioned, the Dutch government had already transposed the di-
rective in 2004, together with the implementation of certain elements of the coali-
tion agreement. Two of these elements concerned restrictions on family formation, 
namely the rise of the income requirement from 100 to 120 per cent of the national 
minimum wage and raising the age-limit from 18 to 21 years. The Dutch govern-
ment argued that these restrictions would bring both spouses in a more favourable 
starting position, and therefore be beneficial to their integration. As this proposal 
was part of a coalition agreement, which was supported by a majority of the par-
liament, it was only contested by a few left-wing opposition parties. The criticism of 
scholars that the changes were incompatible with the directive was therefore hard-
ly taken into account. 
The officials of the German Ministry of Interior had supported the Netherlands 
in creating this possibility in the directive, and as they knew their minister’s prefer-
ence for restrictions, they proposed to adopt this agelimit. The ministers of interior 
of the Länder already advocated the same age-limit at their Innenministerkonferenz 
of 2005. As the Länder were represented in the German delegation during the ne-
gotiations on the directive, they were well informed about the proposals and poli-
cies of other Member States. CDU Minister of Interior Schäuble incorporated this 
idea in his legislative proposal, with the argument that the age-limit, combined with 
a requirement of knowledge of the German language before admission, would pre-
vent young migrants from arranged or forced marriages and would promote their 
emancipation and integration.28 The age-limit however was heavily criticized by the 
Ministry of Justice and by coalition partner SPD, as it would violate the constitution-
al right to family life, as enshrined in Article 6 of the German Constitution. Two ex-
perts were asked for their opinion, but the expert requested by CDU/CSU concluded 
that the proposal was constitutional, while the expert requested by the SPD con-
cluded it was not.29 Finally, in the political compromise between the two coalition 
                                                     
28  Referentenentwurf BMI, 3 January 2006, www.fluechtlingsrat-nrw.de/2256. 
29  Ch. Hillgruber, ‘Mindestalter und sprachliche Integrationsvorleistung-verfassungsgemäße Vo-
raussetzungen des Ehegattennachzugs?’, ZAR 2006: 304-317; Th. Kingreen, ‘Verfassungsfragen 
des Ehegatten- und Familiennachzugs im Aufenthaltsrecht’, ZAR 2007: 13-20. See also L. Block, 
Policy Frames on Spousal Migration in Germany: Regulating Membership, Regulating the Fami-
→ 
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parties, minister Schäuble preferred to introduce the language requirement, which 
was equally contested, rather than the age-limit. The age-limit that was finally in-
troduced, was therefore set at 18 years, with a possibility for exemptions in case of 
hardship.30 
III.2 Language Requirement 
The introduction of knowledge of the language as a condition for admission was 
also based on the Dutch legislation. Germany had supported the Netherlands in 
creating room for this requirement in the directive. The German delegation had 
only the intention to guarantee that Germany could maintain its integration re-
quirement after admission, but it was aware of the intention of the Dutch delega-
tion to apply an integration test abroad. After adoption of the directive, the Dutch 
civil servants actively approached their German colleagues to promote the new 
Dutch legislation on integration requirements. Although this new requirement was 
just as sensitive and contested as the age-limit, the two coalition parties agreed to 
introduce the language requirement in their implementation legislation. According 
to respondents, the SPD decided to accept the test in exchange for the 
Bleiberechtsregelung, with the idea that courts would probably hold that the lan-
guage requirement was unconstitutional. In the third part of this article, we will 
take the language or integration test abroad as a case study for a more in-depth 
analysis of the mutual influence in family reunification policies. 
III.3 Time Limit for Refugees 
The directive leaves Member States the option of introducing a threemonth time 
limit for refugees to apply for family reunification after the granting of refugee sta-
tus.31 If this time limit is exceeded, Member States are allowed to require that the 
refugee fulfills the income and housing requirements of Article 7(1) of the directive. 
This time limit had been successfully advocated by the Dutch government. Although 
the Netherlands was the only Member State applying such a time limit in their na-
tional law, the proposal was accepted by the Council.32 
At the time the directive was adopted, the German legislation had only recent-
ly, with the adoption of the Zuwanderungsgesetz, introduced the possibility for fam-
ily reunification to refugees and subsidiary protected persons. Since then their fami-
ly members were entitled to an Aufenthaltserlaubnis. The new law granted the right 
to family reunification to both holders of a permanent residence permit and mi-
grants who hold a temporary status if there is a prospect of one more year legal 
                                                     
ly, Heidelberg: Springer 2016, for an analysis of the political debate on family reunification in 
Germany. 
30  § 30 lit 2 AufenthG., Hinweise H IV, 1, paras 197 and 199. 
31  Article 12(1) FRD. 
32  In the meantime, fifteen EU Member States have applied the time-limit of three months, see 
the synthesis report European Migration Network, Family reunification for third country nation-
als in the EU Member States and Norway: national practices, Brussels: EMN 2017, para 4.5. 
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residence.33 Previously, immigration authorities had discretion to waive the re-
quirements on income and accommodation if refugees or subsidiary protected per-
sons applied for family reunification. Since the directive became binding, they are 
obliged do to so.34 Thus, the directive has strengthened the right to family reunifica-
tion for refugees, but at the same time, the German government restricted it by 
adopting the time limit of three months, introduced at Dutch insistence in the di-
rective. 
During the preparation of the bill implementing directive 2003/86 and other di-
rectives, German officials were concerned about the feasibility of lodging the appli-
cation in time and discussed the consequences of exceeding the time limit. Howev-
er, granting the sponsor the possibility to submit the application was considered a 
sufficient guarantee, and the legislation does not provide for a hardship clause. 
From the Dutch practise, it appears that the time limit is exceeded in a limited 
number of cases, even if the sponsor is allowed to submit the application. Failures 
are often related to insufficient or incorrect advice of volunteers or professionals 
assisting refugees, combined with the refugee’s limited knowledge of the Dutch 
language and rules. In 2016, a case about exceeding the application time limit was 
discussed before the highest Dutch administrative court in the light of the Family 
Reunification Directive. The Council of State decided to submit a question to the 
Court of Justice on the need for an individual assessment within the framework of 
the Directive and Union law if the time limit of Article 12 is exceeded.35 The answer 
of the Court will also be relevant for Germany, as the German authorities apply the 
time limit strictly, just like their Dutch colleagues. Until now, the Dutch government 
had refused to follow the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Migration 
Affairs to include a hardship clause in the legislation.36 Considering its case law, the 
Court of Justice will probably repeat that Member States have to make an individual 
assessment of the concrete circumstances and interests (in the light of the Articles 7 
and 24 of the EU Charter and the Union law principle of proportionality) in case the 
three-months requirement is exceeded with a few days or weeks. 
In response to many complaints by the Dutch Refugee Council and lawyers 
about the disproportional harsh effects of a refusal in case of exceeding the time 
limit, the Dutch Secretary of State has proposed to prolong the legal time-limit to six 
months.37 Although this new time limit may still lead to disproportional effects, it 
will offer more protection to the family unity. However, the initial Dutch three-
months time limit maintains to be applied in fourteen other Member States, includ-
ing Germany, as a ‘transposition’ of the directive. 
                                                     
33  § 30(1)(3)(e) AufenthG. 
34  Richtlinienumsetzungsgesetz, Artikel 1, nr. 21: § 29(2)(2) AufenthG. 
35  ABRvS 21 June 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:1609. 
36  ACVZ, Na de vlucht herenigd, Den Haag: ACVZ 2014. 
37  See the legislative proposal submitted to Parliament at 19 September 2016, Kamerstukken II 
2016-2017, 34 544. 
Groenendijk & Strik: Family Reunification in Germany, Netherlands and the EU 
14 
IV.  Case Study: Language or Integration Test Abroad 
Germany and the Netherlands were the first EU Member States requiring the pass-
ing of a language test as a condition for admission of family members. The Nether-
lands introduced a language and knowledge test abroad in 2006 and Germany in-
troduced the German language test abroad in 2007. Austria and the UK are the only 
other Member States actually applying a language test as a condition for admission. 
In Denmark and France there was political pressure to follow the ‘Dutch model’, but 
for different reasons (costs in Denmark and the constitutional right to family life in 
France) that model was not adopted in the end.38 
IV.1 The German Model Pushed in the Netherlands 
Germany made passing a German language test a precondition for the admission of 
Aussiedler in 1997 as part of a general policy to reduce the number of Aussiedler 
families admitted in Germany. According to the Süssmuth Kommission the test had 
‘an important filtering effect’,39 resulting in a 67 percent drop decrease of ethnic 
Germans coming to Germany within the first year. In 2000, fewer than half of the 
applicants for the status of ethnic German passed the language test.40 In 2005, the 
language test requirement was extended to the non-German family members of 
Aussiedler. 
In the Netherlands CDA politicians since 2000 argued for the introduction of 
language test abroad as way of starting the integration process already before en-
try.41 Dutch CDA politicians may well have heard from their CDU colleagues about 
the experiences with the German language test abroad at their regular meetings or 
during meetings on immigration policy.42 In 2002, the CDA mentioned this issue 
explicitly in its electoral programme. The issue was not mentioned in the coalition 
agreement of the short-lived CDA-VVD-LPF government. However, the Immigration 
Minister of the populist LPF party, the forerunner of the Party of Geert Wilders, 
                                                     
38  K. Groenendijk, ‘Pre-departure Integration Strategies in the European Union: Integration or 
Immigration Policies?’, 2011 European Journal of Migration and Law (13): 1-30; T. Strik, A. 
Böcker, M. Luiten & R.van Oers, ‘The Intec project: Integration and Naturalisation Tests: the 
new way to European Citizenship, a comparative research on the effects of integration and nat-
uralization tests in nine Member States’, synthesis report of 2010, in: Y. Pascouau & T. Strik 
(eds), Which Integration for Migrants? The relation between the EU and its Member States, 
Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2010. For an overview of the national policies and their impact 
see T. Strik, Integration tests: helping or hindering integration?, Parliamentary Assembly Council 
of Europe, report doc. no. 13361, Strasbourg: Council of Europe 2013. 
39  Süssmuth Kommission (Unabhängige Kommission Zuwanderung – Independent Commission on 
Immigration), Zuwanderung gestalten, Integration Fördern, Berlin: Bundesministerium des In-
nern 2001. 
40  I. Michalowski, ‘Integration Tests in Germany: A Communitarian Approach?’, in: R. van Oers, E. 
Ersbøll & D. Kostakopoulou, A Re-definition of Belonging? Language and Integration Tests in Eu-
rope, Leiden/Boston: Brill 2010, p. 1185-1210. 
41  S.A. Bonjour, Grens en gezin, Beleidsvorming inzake gezinshereniging in Nederland 1955-2005, 
Amsterdam: Aksant 2009, p. 262-263. 
42  See e.g. NRC 7 June 2002. 
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supported this idea and under his responsibility, Dutch officials introduced the issue 
in Brussels. 
IV.2 Negotiations in Brussels 
In October 2002, during the late stages of the negotiations on the Family Reunifica-
tion Directive, the Netherlands obtained support from Germany and Austria for an 
amendment to replace the non-discrimination clause in Article 7(2) of the proposal 
by a clause allowing Member States to require third-country family members to 
comply with integration measures in accordance with national law.43 The Dutch 
government intended to oblige newcomers to follow integration tests before being 
allowed entry in the Netherlands. The German government at that time was only 
considering the introduction of the obligation for family members to attend German 
language courses after admission.44 In the Council Working Group the amendment 
met with opposition from Belgium, France and Sweden. In December 2002, a mo-
tion by a CDA MP in favour of a pre-admission integration test for family migrants 
was adopted in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament with the support of all 
major political parties. The Dutch delegation used this motion as an argument in the 
negotiations in Brussels. In the final phase of the negotiations at the beginning of 
2003, the opposition of other member states was overcome. A sentence was added 
stipulating that integration measures could only be applied to the family members 
of refugees after they had been granted family reunification. This sentence later 
provided the basis for the argument that other family members could be required 
to comply with integration measures before admission. 
IV.3  National Legislation Implementing the Family Reunification Directive 
Only after the Netherlands had succeeded in getting the integration measures in-
cluded in Article 7(2) of the directive, the issue was explicitly mentioned in the coali-
tion agreement of the new centre-right government of May 2003.45 The room for 
pre-entry tests had been created in Brussels, but realising this idea at home was 
another matter. After the adoption of the directive, it took several years to over-
come the opposition against the introduction of the pre-entry tests. In 2005, the 
Dutch Minister for Immigration Verdonk visited the European Commission for a 
consultation on the compatibility with EU law of the bill introducing the integration 
exam abroad. The Commission in reply wrote to the minister that there was gener-
ally no problem of compatibility with Directive 2003/86 if in the application of Arti-
cle 7(2) the proportionality principle and human rights would be respected. Howev-
er, the Commission held that the new requirement could raise legal problems when 
applied to third-country national family members reuniting with nationals of other 
Member States resident in the Netherland and to Turkish nationals considering the 
                                                     
43  Council document 13053/02 of 23 October 2001, p. 12. 
44  T. Strik, Besluitvorming over asiel- en migratierichtlijnen. De wisselwerking tussen nationaal en 
Europees niveau, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers, p. 108-110.  
45  Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 28637, n. 19, p. 14. 
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standstill clauses in the EEC-Turkey association law. The Commission stressed that 
the Court of Justice would have the last word.46 In the Netherlands the integration 
test abroad after a lot of opposition both in parliament, from NGOs and within the 
Ministry of Justice was introduced in 2006. During the debate in the Senate the so-
cial-democratic party PvdA referred to the German language test abroad for Aus-
siedler applying for admission on the basis of their German ethnic origin, hence 
serving a different aim than admission for family reunification. In Germany, the lan-
guage test abroad was introduced in 2007 as part of the legislation implementing a 
series of EU migration and asylum directives. In those years the Dutch government 
repeatedly countered critical parliamentary questions about the integration test 
abroad by stating that other Member States, such as Denmark, Germany and France 
were following the ‘Dutch model’ or considering to do so.47 
In 2008, the issue of raising the level of the Dutch integration test abroad from 
A1minus to A1 was discussed in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament. The 
responsible PvdA Minister in order to overcome opposition declared that she would 
explore the possibilities of involving the Goethe Institutes in offering Dutch lan-
guage courses.48 The Dutch government did and still today does not offer Dutch 
language courses for prospective immigrants abroad. Apparently, these explora-
tions were not successful. The idea died a silent death. 
IV.4  Influence through National Courts and the EU Court of Justice (Imran Case 
Triggering the Debate) 
The first reference to the EU Court of Justice on the compatibility of the Dutch inte-
gration test abroad was made by the Aliens Chamber of the District Court in Zwolle 
in 2011 in the Imran case.49 The case concerned a failed Afghan asylum seeker who, 
after many years of tolerated stay in the Netherlands, during the 2007 regulariza-
tion campaign received a residence permit. After he managed to meet the income 
requirement (120 percent of the national minimum wage at that time) by working 
in two jobs, he asked for reunification with his wife and seven minor children who 
were living in Pakistan. At the Dutch embassy in New Delhi the children received a 
visa, but the mother was refused a visa because she had not passed the integration 
test abroad. On the detailed proposal of her lawyer in the appeal procedure, the 
District Court referred a series of questions on the compatibility of the refusal on 
this ground with Directive 2003/86 and with Articles 21 and 24 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights to the Court of Justice. The District Court also asked the CJEU to 
                                                     
46  Letter of the European Commission of 14 June 2005 to the Dutch minister, forwarded to both 
chambers of the Dutch Parliament by the minister, Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29700, no. 8 
and Kamerstukken I 2004-2005, 29700, no. E. 
47  Kamerstukken II 2007–2008, 31 268, nos. 1–2, p. 131 and reply to written questions Kamerstuk-
ken II 2007-2008, no. 2687 of 18 June 2008. See also Aanh. Hand. EK 2007-2008, no. 13 with 
written questions of 10 July 2008, replies received at 5 September 2008. 
48  Handelingen II, 7 February 2008, p. 51-3726. 
49  Rb Zwolle 31 maart 2011, AWB 10/9716, JV 2017/30, migratieweb ve11000798, annotation A.B. 
Terlouw. 
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deal with this case in the urgent procedure (PPU). The CJEU granted that request, 
which normally would have resulted in a judgment from the CJEU within three 
months. The European Commission in its written observations in this case conclud-
ed that a refusal of family reunification based solely on the ground that the spouse 
did not pass the integration test abroad, is non compatible with Article 7(2) of Di-
rective 2003/86. After the Agent of the Dutch government convinced the Minister 
of Justice of the serous risk that the Court of Justice would come to a similar conclu-
sion, the Afghan mother was granted a visa within a week after the Commission 
filed its conclusion. The Court of Justice then decided that there was no longer a 
need to answer the preliminary questions.50 The statement by the European Com-
mission in this case had effects both in the Netherland and in Germany. 
IV.5  Effects of the Commission’s Position in Imran in Germany 
In Germany, the written observations were translated in German and resulted with-
in a month in parliamentary questions by a Member of the Bundestag about the 
compatibility of the German language test abroad with the directive. The German 
government in its answer referred to the judgment of the Bundesverwaltung-
sgericht (BVerwG) of 30 March 2010. In that judgment, the BVerwG held the Ger-
man language test abroad to be compatible with the directive, three weeks after 
the CJEU judgment in Chakroun, the first reference concerning the directive. How-
ever, the BVerwG did not mention that important CJEU judgment. The German gov-
ernment in its answer stated that it agreed with the judgment of the BVerwG (“Die 
Bundesregierung teilt die in diesem Urteil zum Ausdruck kommende Rechtsauf-
fassung des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts.”), also without mentioning the Chakroun 
judgment of CJEU.51 However, a few months later the BVerwG, after having read 
the observations of the European Commission, held that the issue of the compatibil-
ity of the language test abroad with Article 7(2) of Directive 20003/86 should be 
referred to the Court of Justice.52 The BVerwG could not make the reference itself in 
that case, because the Auswärtige Amt had granted the visa for the family member 
while the case was pending before the BVerwG. Thus, the court made its new posi-
tion known in the decision on the costs in that case. 
The hint of the BVerwG was understood by the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin, the 
only first instance court dealing with appeals in cases concerning visa in Germany. 
That court made three subsequent references to the CJEU on the compatibility with 
the standstill clause in the EEC-Turkey association law and with Article 7(2) of the 
directive. The first reference in October 2012 in the Ayalti case was withdrawn after 
a few months because the visa had been granted in the meantime.53 In the second 
reference, made in February 2013 in the Dogan case, resulted in a judgment by the 
Court of Justice in 2014. The Court held the language test to be incompatible with 
                                                     
50  CJEU, C-155/11PPU (Imran), ECLI:EU:C:2011:387. 
51  Questions by Mehmet Kilic (Greens), BT-Drs. 17/6712, nos. 11 and 12. 
52  BVerwG 28 October 2011, 1 C 9.10, NVwZ 2012, 61. 
53  CJEU, C-513/12 (Decision Pres), ECLI:EU:C:2013:210. 
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the standstill clause in Article 41 of the Additional Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Asso-
ciation Agreement, but did not answer the subsidiary question about the compati-
bility with Directive 2003/86.54 In the third case, referred to Luxemburg three 
months after the Dogan judgment, the Berlin court repeated its question on Article 
7(2). However, that reference in the Oruche case was withdrawn upon suggestion 
by the CJEU’s Registrar, after the judgment of the CJEU in the K&A case on the 
Dutch integration test abroad.55 
Summaries of all three relevant judgments of the BVerwG on the German lan-
guage test abroad were published in Dutch translation on Migratieweb, the special-
ized website for Dutch immigration lawyers.56 The three references by the Verwal-
tungsgericht Berlin were made accessible in Dutch in the same way, using the trans-
lation provided by the Court of Justice on its website. These German judgments had 
relatively little effect in the Netherlands, due to a judgment of the highest Dutch 
court in social security matters. That court (Centrale Raad van Beroep) in 2011 held 
the obligation to pass the Dutch integration test after admission to be incompatible 
with the standstill clause and with the prohibition of discrimination on the ground 
of nationality in the EEC-Turkey association law.57 According to the Dutch Aliens Act, 
Turkish nationals after that judgment automatically were exempt from the Dutch 
integration exam abroad as well. 
IV.6  Effects of the Commission’s Position in Imran in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands the position of the European Commission had clear effects in the 
case law. One of the District Courts explicitly held that it agreed with the opinion of 
the Commission on the incompatibility of the Dutch integration test abroad with 
Article 7(2) of the directive.58 In the appeal filed by the government, the highest 
administrative court which in an earlier case summarily held that refusal of reunifi-
cation for not having passed the exam was compatible with Article 5(5) of the Di-
rective,59 now had the choice between three options: also adopt the position ex-
pressed by the Commission, provide serious arguments why it did not agree with 
that opinion or make a reference to the EU Court of Justice. The court chose the last 
option, using as one its arguments that the Court of Justice in its Dogan judgment 
did not answer the question of the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin on Article 7(2) of Di-
rective 2003/86.60 This became the case K&A in Luxemburg. The CJEU judgment in 
K&A in the Netherlands resulted in a reduction of the costs of the integration exam 
abroad and in a reformulation and a clearly more serious and individual application 
                                                     
54  CJEU, C-138/13 (Dogan), ECLI:EU:C:2014: 2066. 
55  CJEU, C-527/14 (Decision Pres), ECLI:EU:C:2015:599. 
56  BVerwG 30 March 2010, 1 C 8.09, in the Netherlands: Migratieweb ve11000600, BVerwG 28 Oc-
tober 2011, 1 C 9.10, in the Netherlands: Migratieweb ve 11002774 and BVerwG 4 September 
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57  CRvB 16 August 2011, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2011:BR4959. 
58  Aliens Chamber District Court Den Bosch 23 November 2012, ECLI:NL:RSBGR: 2012:BY4171. 
59  ABRvS 9 February 2009, ECLI:NL:RVS:2009:BH5761. 
60  ABRvS 1 April 2014, ECLI:NL:RVS:2014:1196. 
Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series: 2018/02 
19 
of the hardship clause.61 Other elements of the K&A judgment, such as the warning 
by the Court that the exam should not function as a selection mechanism, were 
taken less serious by the Dutch authorities. More than half of the applicants from 
certain countries of origin fail the test. After the testing method had been changed 
in 2015, the average pass rate has gone down from 66% to 57% for applicants who 
took the exam for the first time. For several nationalities, the pass rate was be-
tween 20 and 40%.62 
It is our impression that the effects of the K&A judgment in Germany so far are 
minimal, but still a point of dispute.63 The Integrationsbeauftragte of the Federal 
Government in her report of December 2016 explicitly stated that the legislation on 
the German language test abroad in force since 2007 is incompatible with Union 
law (‘Die Entscheidung zeigt aber auch, dass die seit 2007 geltende deutsche gesetz-
liche Regelung zum Spracherfordernis (§ 30 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 2 AufenthG) ohne Här-
tefallregelung unvereinbar mit EU-Recht war.‘64). This opinion was shared by the 
administrative appeals court competent to deal with visa cases and it was subject of 
an infringement procedure of the European Commission. 
IV.7  Infringement Procedures Started by the European Commission 
The Commission started three times a formal infringement procedure against Ger-
many concerning the incorrect implementation of Directive 2003/86. In the first 
procedure in 2005, the Commission acted against the non-implementation of the 
directive. This case came before the Court of Justice in 2007, but was withdrawn by 
the Commission after the adoption of the Act implementing a series of EU migration 
and asylum instruments in the Aufenthaltsgesetz in that year.65 The Commission 
started the second infringement procedure in 2013, when an informal Pilot begun 
in July 2012 with two series of questions on the actual application of Article 7(2) of 
the Directive in German legislation and practice did not result in satisfactory an-
swers by the German government. This case was closed after two and a half years 
of correspondence and negotiations between the Commission and the German 
government.66 The third case on the implementation of the Dogan judgment in 
Germany was started by the Commission again with an informal Pilot shortly after 
that CJEU judgement in 2014. When the reactions of the German government, that 
after several months it was still studying the meaning of the judgment, proved un-
satisfactory, the Commission started a formal infringement procedure in 2015, con-
                                                     
61  Letter of Minister of Social Affairs of 17 December 2015 to the Second Chamber, TK 32005, 
no. 8. 
62  Ministry of Social Affairs, Monitor basisexamen inburgering buitenland 2015-1, Barneveld: Min-
istry of Social Affairs 2015. 
63  See answers to parliamentary questions of Ulla Jelpke (Linke), BT 18/9651 of 16 September 
2016 and of Sevim Dagdelen (Linke), BT-Drs. 18/10596, nr. 14 regarding a.o. the actual applica-
tion of the hardship-clause and the costs of the courses. 
64  BT-Drs. 18/10610, p. 282-284. 
65  Infringement case 20050924 before the CJEU as case C-192/07, deleted from the Court’s regis-
ter by order of the President of the CJEU of 24 January 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:43. 
66  Infringement case 20132009 closed on 19 November 2015. 
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sidering that Union requires the hardship clause not be in internal instructions (Er-
lass) but in regular legislation.67 This view was shared by the Administrative Appeal 
Court Berlin-Brandenburg early in 2015.68 In August 2015 a new hardship clause 
was introduced in the relevant legislative provision, § 30 I 3, 6 AufenthG, without 
any mention neither of the CJEU case law nor of the infringement procedure. The 
Integrationsbeauftragte considered that this new clause did not meet the standards 
required by the K&A judgment.69 However, the Commission was satisfied and 
closed this infringement procedure in April 2017. 
Against the Netherlands, the Commission started one formal infringement pro-
cedure on the untimely communication of the implementation of the Directive 
2003/86 and several informal pilot procedures. The public debate on the implemen-
tation of the directive in the Netherlands was stimulated by the 2008 Commission’s 
report on the implementation of the directive in Member States. In that report the 
Commission specified a series of conditions for integration measures before admis-
sion to be compatible with the directive. The Netherlands was not explicitly men-
tioned, but it was clear that this part of the report aimed at one or two Member 
States in particular, i.e. Germany and the Netherlands.70 The Commission’s report 
gave rise to several series of critical parliamentary questions by Dutch MPs.71 The 
Commission started its first Pilot regarding the Netherlands in November 2012 after 
the Dutch Refugee Council and the national organisation of Turkish immigrants IOT 
had filed complaints about the implementation of the Directive in the Nether-
lands.72 This Pilot concerned not only the Dutch integration tests abroad and its 
effect for illiterate family members, but also a range of other implementation issues 
considered problematic by the Commission, such as the high fees, the family reuni-
fication of refugees, the treatment of children during the interview after the visa 
applications and late applications. On several of these issues the rules or the prac-
tice in the Netherlands have been improved in recent years without any reference 
being made to the pressure exerted by the Commission. The Commission’s pressure 
often coincided with pressure and actions by national institutions, such as the Na-
tional Ombudsman, national courts and individual MPs. In 2015 the Commission 
asked the Dutch government how it had implemented the CJEU judgment in the 
K&A case on the integration test abroad. 
There is no explicit relationship between the infringement procedures against 
the two Member States that first introduced the integration/ language test abroad. 
But there is an apparent implicit relationship. The Commission used the experience 
acquired in the discussions with one Member State in its discussions with the other 
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Member State. Some of the questions in the 2012 Pilot regarding the German lan-
guage test abroad were based on experience with the Dutch integration test 
abroad. On the other hand, the position of the Commission on which integration 
measures abroad are compatible with Article 7(2) changed from a liberal stance in 
the Imran case in 2012, towards a more restrictive position in the Dogan case in 
2014 and the K&A case in 2015, probably partly as a result of the changing political 
climate and partly of pressure from both Member States concerned. 
IV.8  Little German Support for Dutch Efforts to Amend Directive 2003/86 and 
Directive 2004/38 
In the coalition agreement of the right-wing minority government of VVD and CDA 
in power between 2010 and 2012, which depended for its majority in Parliament on 
the votes of Geert Wilders Party, the three parties announced to make the family 
reunification policy stricter on 17 points. When it became clear that most of these 
changes would be incompatible with directive 2003/86, the government decided to 
start a lobby for amending the directive. A position paper, proposing ten amend-
ments of the directive, was published73 and the Minister of Immigration visited (de-
leted: several) capitals of several Member States and gave interviews in the national 
press.74 The minister reported positive reactions in Vienna and Prague but not in 
the capitals of major Member States. The European Commission reacted to the 
Dutch pressure by publishing in 2011 a Green Paper on the right to family reunifica-
tion of thirdcountry nationals living in the EU and started a public consultation by 
formulating a series of questions to the Member States, NGOs and other stakehold-
ers.75 In their reactions several Member States stressed that integration was a na-
tional competence. Austria, Germany and a number of German Länder pleaded for 
an amendment of the Directive to explicitly allow for pre-entry measures, a desire 
that was fulfilled a few years later by the Court of Justice in the K&A judgment. The 
Netherlands was the only Member State proposing to allow revocation of residence 
permits when family members fail to meet integration conditions. Several Member 
States expressed a preference for less restrictive or non-compulsory integration 
measures.76 
The 2011 Dutch position paper also contained a proposal to amend Directive 
2004/38 on the free movement of Union citizens in order to delete the right to 
family reunification with third-country family members of EU nationals from that 
directive and instead apply Directive 2003/86 to those family members. This pro-
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posal would have seriously reduced the right to family reunification of EU nationals. 
Implicitly, this proposal would have extended the possibility to require family mem-
bers of nationals of other Member States to pass a language or integration test be-
fore being allowed to join their EU family member. That wish was expressed in polit-
ical and administrative circles in Berlin and The Hague years ago. However, the issue 
was outside the scope of the Commission’s Green Paper. The idea surprisingly re-
turned on the agenda during the negotiations between the EU-27 and Cameron on 
the deal to prevent a Brexit concluded in the European Council in February 2016.77 
But the protection of the right to family reunification of EU nationals, resident in the 
UK after the Brexit was firmly embedded in the preparatory documents of the 
Commission for the negotiations that started in June 2017.78 The departure of the 
UK will mean that a strong supporter for reducing the right to family reunification of 
Union citizens will no longer be present in the Council and that the Netherlands 
(and possibly Germany as well) will be more isolated in the EU on this issue. The 
two countries raised the issue of integration of EU nationals in the Council of Minis-
ters in 2011 and organised a conference on this issue in Rotterdam in 2012.79 Ap-
parently, the two states did not receive much support for their views from other 
Member States so far. 
V.  Conclusion 
The developments of national policies on family reunification clearly show that the 
Europeanisation has opened up more avenues for mutual influence between gov-
ernments. The adoption of a directive is one source of convergence, but the many 
occasions for exchanges of information, experiences and views inherent to the Eu-
ropeanisation process is most likely as important in bringing about convergence. 
The German and Dutch officials and politicians used these venues for cooperation 
to gain support for their policies and plans during the negotiations, and afterwards 
to learn about new restrictions and how to seek the limits of the directive. The case 
study on the language and integration requirement shows that this influence occurs 
in a dynamic and reciprocal process, but not only between state actors. National 
courts, lawyers, NGOs and members of parliament all influence the way their gov-
ernment applies the directive, and they also learn from their colleagues in the 
neighbouring country or in other Member States. Information about national poli-
cies, effects of policies, and case law in other Member States may serve as sources 
for advocacy, arguments for national courts, for controlling the government or filing 
complaints at the European Commission. This internal pressure may trigger EU 
Court of Justice judgments, and is needed afterwards to ensure compliance with 
those judgments. Practice shows that full compliance with the CJEU judgments does 
                                                     
77  See Annex VII to European Council conclusions of 18 and 19 February 2016, document EUCO 
1/16, p. 35. 
78  European Commission, Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations with the 
UK under Article 50 TEU, Position paper ‘Essential Principles on Citizens’ Rights’, Doc. no. TF50 
(2017) 1/2 of 24 May 2017. 
79  Council document 18296/11 of 12 December 2011. 
Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series: 2018/02 
23 
not occur automatically, especially if the judgment concerns another Member State. 
So to ensure that the harmonization process of family reunification policies evolves 
within the framework of Union Law and the fundamental rights, sufficient checks 
and balances in that process are needed. This begs for more international channels 
of exchange for national and European actors involved in the right to family reunifi-
cation. Furthermore, an intensified and interdisciplinary cooperation between mi-
gration scholars from different Member States contributes to comparative over-
views, legal analyses and also information on effects of certain national measures, 
which should be taken into account while judging on their effectiveness. The “Ho-
henheimer Tage zum Ausländerrecht” bring all these actors together and therefore 
offer a unique venue for these exchanges and cooperation. We cannot overesti-
mate how this contributes to the highly necessary checks and balances in the inter-
play between the European and national level. The network Klaus has founded in 
this way is solid and promises to be ever growing. 
 
